Key takeaways
- The Luddites of 1811 to 1816 were protesting about wages and working conditions, not machines themselves.
- Britain’s early industrial growth saw wages lag for decades before rising.
- Past automation has created new jobs, but with painful transitions, and no law says this must repeat.
In 1930 John Maynard Keynes predicted that within a century, technology would make us so productive that people might work fifteen hours a week. He was right about the productivity and wrong about the leisure. His forecast is a good place to begin, because every argument about automation is really an argument about who gets the gains.
The Luddites
Between 1811 and 1816, English textile workers broke machines in protest. The name Luddite is now an insult for anyone who fears technology, but historians stress that the workers were skilled craftsmen defending their wages and trade against employers who used new frames to cut pay and hire cheaper labour. They were not stupid. They were bargaining, with hammers, in a country that gave them no vote.
The long pause
The economist Robert Allen has argued that during Britain’s early industrialisation output per worker rose while real wages stagnated for roughly half a century, an episode sometimes called Engels’ pause. Eventually wages rose, and new industries and jobs appeared that nobody had predicted. When automatic teller machines spread, the number of bank tellers in the United States did not fall for decades, because cheaper branches meant more of them. History gives grounds for hope, and also a warning: the transition can last a generation, and those who bear it are often not those who benefit.
What may differ now
Earlier machines replaced muscle and routine; today’s systems can perform tasks that once demanded professional training, such as drafting, analysis and coding. Whether new jobs will arrive in time is an open question. Experiments with basic income, such as Finland’s 2017 to 2018 trial and long-term cash programmes in Kenya, show that regular payments can improve wellbeing without ending work, though none has been tried at national scale.
Editorial assessment
Predicting the end of work has a poor record, and so does predicting that nothing will change. The sounder conclusion is that the effects depend on policy: on education, on how gains are taxed and shared, and on whether workers have power to bargain. Qualifications will not vanish, but the skills that last are likely to be judgement, adaptability and the ability to work with others. The Luddites’ real lesson is that technology is never only a technical question.
Questions to think about
- What should a young person study if they do not know which skills will matter?
- Is a basic income a safety net, a trap or a right?
Disagree? Say why in the discussion below. Good arguments change minds.
References and sources
- Robert C. Allen, “Engels’ Pause: Technical Change, Capital Accumulation, and Inequality in the British Industrial Revolution,” Explorations in Economic History (2009)
- John Maynard Keynes, “Economic Possibilities for our Grandchildren” (1930)
Discussion
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